The South Vietnamese Army, often depicted as the “hapless protégé” to the U.S. military, began operations in Cambodia as a “newly ferocious force . . . exulting in their unaccustomed role of conquering heroes” (“Cambodia: A cocky new ARVN,” 1970, p. 34). Articles reported that morale rose among the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as soldiers plunged more than 50 miles across the border and killed nearly 10,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in the first week of ground operations in Cambodia (pp. 33–35). Here, the ARVN’s military success and jubilation further justified further the incursion into Cambodia. Major General Hal D. McCowan was quoted saying, “Cambodia has been a bonanza for ARVN. Nothing helps like kicking the hell out of the other guy” (p. 35). Although the South Vietnamese army continued to march through Cambodia, over time, its successes were tempered by the reality of waging war as articles cited poor pay, lack of leadership, and bureaucratic corruption as factors that would continue to plague the South Vietnamese once the Americans left (p. 35). As an extension of U.S. power in Cambodia, the ARVN was portrayed as ultimately a lackluster replacement without the resources or training to maintain gains in Cambodia while also fighting Communists inside Vietnam’s borders.
This reported inadequacy, then, served as a strategic justification for the U.S. military’s continued presence, as Southeast Asia was portrayed as the only place where America could demonstrate dominance through military power. …
The United States’ initial justifications for sending troops and bombs into Cambodia revolved around the strategic benefit the country’s neutrality provided the North Vietnamese. Because “huge hunks of Cambodia appear[ed] to be under Hanoi’s control,” and “the Communist Vietnamese still appeared to roam almost at will over much of Cambodia,” the necessity of any military operations in or over Cambodia appeared justified as a response to the particular strategic benefit the country’s neutrality afforded the National Liberation Front as it tried to build sanctuaries and supply lines in the forest along the border (“Cambodia: Toward war by proxy,” 1970, p. 27).
After Nixon sent ground soldiers into Cambodia, strategically dealing with National Liberation Front forces initially dominated the tenor of articles in Time. As “Communist forces seem ubiquitous and unbeatable in the entire third of the country east of the Mekong River,” the sheer incalculability of their presence provided a strategic threat that logically demanded American attention (“Ten days,” 1970, p. 47). As such, Cambodia initially was not presented as a sovereign actor, but as a stage upon which the diplomatic, political, and military operations of the Vietnam War played out. In Time’s coverage, “Defense Secretary Melvin Laird indicated that the U.S. would probably continue to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail” while also optimistically speaking about the possibilities of a Southeast Asian peace conference (“Indochina’s crumbling frontiers,” 1970, p. 38). Here, the phrase “bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail” obscured the political ramifications of bombing Cambodia and any possible violations of the nation’s sovereignty while the word “probably” off-handedly kept the bombings within the realm of discursive possibility and not bloody actuality. …
If Cambodia can be understood as a particular geographic space where the violence and horror of the Vietnam War had begun to spill over, then the U.S. military was portrayed as a stabilizing force whose purpose was to prevent the horror of war in Vietnam from spreading across the country’s borders. U.S. military strength, as an extension of American moral certitude in Cambodia, amounted to “the worst setback the Communists have had in 20 years of war in Indochina” as “there [was] no sanctuary in Cambodia free of U.S. aerial attack or safe from assault by the South Vietnamese” (p. 18). This portrayal of U.S. military power as a dominant and stabilizing force in the country was initially tied to a strategic ability to push Communist soldiers out of Cambodia, thus revealing an understanding of Cambodia as little more than the geographic space where military operations happened.
However, when Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk in March of 1970, the subsequent destabilization led to an apparent influx of Communist activity into the country, leading to a prolonged civil war between Communist sympathizers, Sihanouk loyalists, and Lon Nol’s new government (Brinkley, 2011). …
Suddenly, the press and the American diplomatic apparatus began to consider Cambodia’s contested sovereignty as a key political condition that could offer an advantage if exploited properly. Kissinger saw Lon Nol as an important ally who could possibly overturn Sihanouk’s longstanding neutrality policy and offer America a permanent ally in the region and provide an important firewall to the spread of communism (Kiernan, 1985).
In Time, the chaos of Lon Nol’s coup and the ensuing civil war replaced the presence of National Liberation Front soldiers as a justification for a U.S. military presence in Cambodia. The country became “the focal point of the Indochina conflict. Many of its towns have been savaged by fighting; half the country has fallen under Communist control and much of the remainder is contested” (“World: Lon Nol and Sihanouk Speak Out,” p.27). When Lon Nol and Sihanouk appeared as quoted sources commenting on the aftermath of the coup and the results of American operations in Cambodia, they gave voice to the arguments supporting and critiquing American involvement in the country. While Lon Nol explicitly blamed Vietnamese communists for inciting violence within the borders of Cambodia, Sihanouk asserted a particularly strong critique of U.S. military operations, stating, “It would be pure hypocrisy to assert that the United States is defending the highest interests of the Indochinese people . . . using for that purpose bombs and napalm and an apocalyptic destruction of the countries and peoples concerned” (p. 29). This was a rare moment of direct critique directed at the U.S. military, but the fact that it comes from Sihanouk and is countered by Lon Nol’s differing opinion reveals the political dynamics of Cambodia as a key strategic consideration tied to American dominance in the region. Furthermore, Sihanouk’s own political machinations were often described in Time as “Byzantine” as he sought Russian and Chinese support in pushing the Vietnamese out of Cambodia (“Danger and Opportunity in Indochina,” 1970, p.34). Regardless of whether critics found the use of U.S. power objectionable, when allies such as Lon Nol supported U.S. military power in Cambodia, these statements articulate the terms for understanding the legitimacy of U.S. military power in the region.
As the invasion of Cambodia marked an ebb in American interest in the region, the event created the terms of military violence by which politics in the region were expressed in Time. When U.S. troops left Cambodia on June 30, 1970, the country descended into further war between the nascent Khmer Rouge, Lon Nol’s national Army, Sihanouk’s own sympathizers, and North Vietnamese soldiers. As American soldiers left the country, “Cambodia, in short, [was] destined to become the first test of the Nixon Doctrine, which encourages Asians to solve Asia’s problems,” although, in Time’s reporting and analysis, the absence of a U.S. military presence all but ensured that the country would descend into violent chaos (“Cambodia: Struggle for Survival,” 1970, p. 29). Coverage in the magazine reflected the diplomatic understanding that a further destabilized Cambodia would lead to a power vacuum that Rampage,” 1970, p. 42; and “In search of an elusive foe,” 1970, p. 42). The words of an “old, half-blind widow” and Vietnamese refugee reflected the growing chaos in Cambodia when she concisely, elliptically, and presciently said, “I am very, very happy to go back to Vietnam. And I am very happy not to be killed” (“Exodus on the Mekong,” 1970, p. 39).
Although no overt critique of American operations in Cambodia emerged in Time, there exists on the surface of the text a sense of foreboding about the country’s future as the Americans slowly leave and the country begins a descent into a chaos that, five years later, would culminate in the rise of Pol Pot and the eventual genocide of nearly a quarter of the country’s population (Kiernan, 1985).