Flo, Hayreddin Barbarossa, nicht Kaiser Barbarossa.
Zur Schließung von Lücken und/oder wenigstens schönen Bildersammlungen zu fröhnen:
1. [BARBAROS HAYRETTÝN PAÞA, TÜRK DENÝZCÝLÝK TARÝHÝ, OSMANLI DONANMASI, TÜRK KORSANLARI, DENÝZ HARÝTALARI, ESKÝ ÝSTANBUL RESÝMLERÝ, Hayreddin Pacha, Chajruddín Barbarossa, Khair-ed-din Barbarossa, Captain Barbarossa, Ottoman Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa
(Osmanische Marinegeschichte, auch engl. ist dabei eingestreut)
2. Das Kapitel: Of prisoners, slaves and the charity of strangers teilweise hier einsehbar:
The Ottoman Empire and the World ... - Google Book Search,
(seriöses Standardwerk)
3. Ausschnitte aus Artikeln aus: Jonathan Dewald (Hrsg.): Europe 1450 to 1789: encyclopedia of the early modern world. 2004.
EUROPEANS AS SLAVES
Europeans were not only slaveholders in the early
modern period; they were also slaves. From at least
the sixteenth century, thousands of Europeans were
captured by Muslim privateers in or along the coasts
of the Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean, or North
Sea and sold into slave markets from Alexandria,
Egypt to Meknes, Morocco. Seamen, fishermen,
traders, travelers, and soldiers were the most vulnerable
to seaborne raiders. On land, with the expansion
of the Ottoman Empire into Europe, peasant
families were just as subject to enslavement as were
combatant soldiers. Some Christian captives converted
to Islam and made new lives for themselves,
others were ransomed by their relatives, escaped, or
died in captivity. Some were pressed into service as
galley slaves on Muslim ships.
Many observers
noted that their treatment there was better than on
the French, Italian, or Spanish galleys.
In general,
slavery in the Ottoman Empire was reportedly milder than slavery elsewhere, and manumission
(the individual freeing of slaves) was a common,
even expected, form of charity for observant Muslims.
In the second half of the seventeenth century,
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the chief minister to France’s
king Louis XIV (ruled 1643–1715), expanded a
system of galley slaves as punishment for many different
kinds of crimes. More than 1,500 Protestant
dissenters were condemned to the French galleys.
During the same period, the Habsburg emperor
Leopold I (ruled 1658–1705), in conjunction with
Louis XIV, suspended the religious freedom guaranteed
by the Hungarian constitution and sent
some sixty Protestant ministers to be sold to the
Spanish galleys; twenty-six surviving prisoners were
released in 1676. The French galley penal system
continued until 1748.
In the same period, from the end of the seventeenth
century until the end of the eighteenth, the
seizure of war captives for ransom or labor became a
fixture of warfare between the Russian and Ottoman
empires. However, in contrast to the Ottomans,
whose slaves were overwhelmingly non-Muslim
outsiders, Russia drew most of its slaves from its
own domestic population, many of whom sold
themselves to escape famine or destitution.
Slavery persisted in Russia until the early eighteenth
century, when the tsarist state redefined domestic
slaves as serfs so that they might be taxable.
The line between serf and slave, however, was often
blurred in practice. Slavery in Ottoman Europe continued
in reduced form through the nineteenth century
until its formal abolition at the end of the
century.
SUE PEABODY
aus PIRACY:
The early modern period in Mediterranean history—
roughly the fifteenth through the eighteenth
century—begins with the tapering off of one such
period of piratical recrudescence. The final crumbling
of Byzantine maritime power in the fourteenth
century encouraged fierce competition between
Latin Christians and Turkish emirs forcontrol of the Aegean and its vital trade links. Both
sides built up their navies, raided each other’s territory,
and preyed on each other’s shipping in pursuit
of supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. Both
sides recruited pirates (conveniently called corsairs
once they were serving a legitimate political entity)
to help them achieve their goals. The Knights of St.
John, for instance, captured the island of Rhodes in
1308 with the help of a Genoese corsair (Inalcik,
p. 186). The eventual victor in this fierce competition
was the Turkish side, specifically the Ottoman
Turks whose original base was inland but who eventually
expanded outward to become a maritime
power of the first order. With the conquest of Constantinople
(1453), the Ottomans became masters
of the vital commercial routes that linked the Black
Sea and the Aegean. In 1522 they vanquished one
of their most persistent naval competitors when Suleiman
the Magnificent captured Rhodes and forced
the departure of the Knights. Venice continued to
have possessions in the eastern Mediterranean, but
the Ottomans steadily eroded her power as well.
Having thus established control over the area,
the Sultans quite naturally no longer looked with
favor upon piracy and punished pirates whenever
they were able to do so. Those who could be absorbed
into the state apparatus—as naval commanders,
for example—enjoyed a new life as Ottoman
officials. Independent actors, however, were no
longer tolerated. In 1504 the Ottomans seized the
ships of a pirate who had served as a corsair in the
recent wars with Venice. When he continued his
raids in peacetime, he lost not only his ships; the
authorities burned his house to the ground and executed
seventy of his men (Brummett, p. 99). Ottoman
maritime supremacy, combined with the Venetian
desire to protect her commercial interests,
ensured that the eastern Mediterranean enjoyed a
long hiatus from piracy in the sixteenth century.
Farther to the west, in North Africa, the picture
was largely similar. The corsairing captains who had
raided the Spanish coastland on behalf of the Ottomans
now settled down to life as the rulers of the
newly acquired territories in North Africa. The high
level of hostility between the sultan and the Spanish
kings, however, meant that piracy was more tolerated
in the western Mediterranean.
Things changed again after the Ottoman defeat
at the battle of Lepanto (1571). Revisionist historiography
has made it clear that this clash was not the
watershed it was once presumed to be. It was important,
however, in terms of piracy. The staggering
and ever increasing costs of galley warfare convinced
both the Ottomans and the Spaniards that it was
best to turn their energies elsewhere. The Mediterranean
was left to its own devices. The pirates once
again took to the seas, and the seventeenth century
was the golden age of the pirate republic. The slave
markets of Algiers and of Valletta teemed with miserable
captives from the other side, as both Muslims
and Christians pursued their opponents with equal
ferocity.
To a certain extent the pirates of the seventeenth
century were operating on their own initiative
and were motivated by the issues of economic
scarcity that had always figured prominently. As
with earlier centuries, however, shifts in the Mediterranean
balance of power were working themselves
out through piracy. It was in this period that
northern newcomers—the Dutch and the English—
put an end to Italian commercial supremacy
in the Mediterranean and piracy was a vital instrument
in this assault. The English pirate in his berton
became a hated and feared figure for the Venetian
merchant. This northern invasion is only the bestknown
example, however. France backed Catholic
pirates—particularly the Knights of St. John—as
part of its ambition to replace the Venetians as the
preeminent Catholic power in the eastern Mediterranean,
and to hurt her economic competitors. The
North African regencies of Tripoli, Tunis, and
Algiers would prove similarly useful for English and
French ambitions. Throughout the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries these two powers signed a
number of treaties with the North Africans, agreements
that were designed both to protect their own
merchants from North African piracy and to encourage
raids on their competitors’ shipping. In the
eighteenth century the power of the regencies
dwindled as they themselves devoted fewer and
fewer resources to such assaults and European supremacy
became ever more evident. Nevertheless,
remnants of the system were still at work as late as
the American Revolution. Once the Americans declared
their independence from the British, Lloyds
of London discreetly informed the North Africans
that American ships were no longer under the protection
of the British navy. North African attacks onthe merchant shipping of the new republic predictably
ensued.
In 1798 Napoleon Bonaparte captured the
island of Malta and took the previously unimaginable
step of freeing all the Muslim captives
held by the Knights of St. John. His dramatic actions
were an illustration of a more prosaic truth. By
the end of the eighteenth century combatants in the
Mediterranean were strong enough to fight their
naval battles and conduct their trade without the
help of Mediterranean pirates turned corsairs. Once
the state turned its back, piracy never again achieved
the international significance that it had enjoyed
from time to time in the early modern period.
MOLLY GREENE
zum Schluss noch Ausschnitte aus dem Artikel
MEDITERRANEAN BASIN im
Anhang downloadbar, u.a. mit der Erläuterung zum Niedergang der Mittelmeer-Piraterie, sehr interessant!:
daraus z.B. dieser mir vorher unbekannte Aspekt:
"Hostilities between England and Spain came to
an end in 1604, but the ‘‘
Barbary pirates’’ (the term
originally referred
to the English in North Africa,
not to the Muslim population) did not go home."