Die TM war keine "Show", auch kein "Bluff" (zitatweise angelehnt an Wilhelm II. und seiner Randbemerkung zur Annexionskrise).
Clark, Schlafwandler:
„Zusammenfassend kam der Vorsitzende des Ministerrats Iwan Goremykin zu dem Schluss, dass es »die Pflicht der kaiserlichen Regierung sei, unverzüglich eine Entscheidung zugunsten Serbiens zu treffen«. Festigkeit werde mit einer größeren Wahrscheinlichkeit als Versöhnung den Frieden sichern, und falls dies scheitern sollte, müsse »Russland bereit sein, die von ihm geforderten Opfer zu bringen«.“
Das war vielmehr die Antwort bzw. diplomatische Eskalation auf das Ultimatum an Serbien, und kalkulierte für den Fall, dass die "feste Haltung" in ihrer Abschreckungswirkung versagt, Krieg ein.
Die Kommunikation war wie beschrieben katastrophal, und konterkarierte die intendierte Abschreckungswirkung. McMeekin behandelt das zwar oberflächlich, aber hier als Beispiel:
„German and Austrian intelligence on Russia’s Period Preparatory to War was necessarily less solid than this inside account from an allied liaison officer. Nevertheless, by nightfall Sunday it was thorough enough that Pourtalès felt the need to confront Sazonov at Chorister’s Bridge, notwithstanding their friendly morning conversation on the train. At around nine PM, the German ambassador put in a formal protest with Russia’s foreign minister about “the news widely reported among the circles of foreign military attachés, according to which several Russian army corps have been sent toward the western border in accordance with a mobilization directive.” Sazonov, Pourtalès reported to Berlin, “replied that he could guarantee that no mobilization order had been given, and that none could be expected until Austria-Hungary undertook hostile measures against Russia.” Nevertheless, in an important caveat that seemed to contradict his first statement, the Russian conceded that “certain military measures . . . had been taken.”
At about the same time Sunday evening, Russia’s war minister summoned Major Eggeling for an urgent audience. Evidently aware of German suspicions, Sukhomlinov sought to defuse them by offering the German military attaché “his word of honor that no mobilization order had yet been issued.” Certain preparatory „measures were, he conceded, underway, but Sukhomlinov insisted that “not a horse was being requisitioned, not a reservist called up.” This was a bald-faced lie, although, lacking hard evidence, the German would have been hard-pressed to prove this. Instead, Eggeling confined his own comments to warning Sukhomlinov that even Russian “mobilization against Austria alone must be regarded as very dangerous.” Overall, the military attaché reported to Army Chief of Staff Moltke of his frustrating audience with the Russian war minister: “I got the impression of great nervousness and anxiety. I consider the wish for peace genuine, military statements so far correct, that complete mobilization has probably not been ordered, but preparatory measures are very far-reaching.” The Russians, he concluded, “are evidently striving to gain time for new negotiations and for continuing their armaments."
McMeekin. July 1914.
Totalversagen bei der diplomatischen Ausführung trifft die Sache völlig. Die klare Kommunikation für diesen Schritt - direkte Konsequenz des öst. Ultimatums und der Kriegsabsicht gegen Serbien - ergibt überhaupt erst die Abschreckungswirkung. McMeekin spekuliert auch darüber, ob Sazonow angesichts der drohenden Konsequenzen evt. eingeknickt ist.
