@Lynxxx: In diesem englischen Beitrag steht nichts über das Thema dieses Threads drin, i.e. Ursache der Siege Eugens.
Der Thread behandelt auch die Gründe der Niederlagen der Osmanen, siehe Threadtitel. Oder hab ich mich tatsächlich versehen?
Ansonsten: Es ist nicht so einfach eine Antwort zu geben, es reicht da leider nicht, einfach zu sagen, die haben die und die Taktik gewählt, und das ist schon die Antwort. (Ist halt nicht Age of Empire...
)
Es ist beim Osm. Reich einfacher etwas zu beschreiben, als etwas zu erklären. Schicksal eines "Orchideenfaches" mit Millionen ungesehener Quellen in den Archiven...
feif:
ist nicht verkehrt eine Zusammenfassung zu posten und dann den Link zur Seite wo der Text herkommt. Meist ist die Ursprungsseite besser formatiert. So kann man besser abschätzen ob man alles lesen will oder nicht...
Das ist kein Onlinetext, sondern ein Buch. Siehe ersten Satz. Zudem auch "nur" die "Conclusion". Deshalb kann ich auch nichts verlinken. Nur Scannen.
OH!!
Als ich grad in google den Amazon-Link suchte, habe ich feststellen können, dass es zu großen Teilen inzwischen digitalisiert wurde! (IMHO, vor einigen Monaten noch nicht...)
Schlecht für Prof. Faroqhi, gut für euch, da ihr nun selber das Kapitel über "Strength and Weakness of ottoman Warfare" lesen könnt, ab S. 98:
The Ottoman Empire and the World ... - Google Buchsuche
Hier gibt es ansonsten auch ein Search Inside:
Amazon.de: The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (Library of Ottoman Studies): Suraiya Faroqhi: Englische Bücher
Sehr gutes Buch! Neueste Erkenntnisse.
Ansonsten aus unserem Literaturtipp (bei den Osm.) noch ein Auszug:
Donald Quataert: The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922. 2. Aufl. S. 37 ff.:
"Introduction
In marked contrast to the military and political successes of the 1300–
1683 era, defeats and territorial withdrawals characterized this long eighteenth
century, 1683–1798. The political structure continued to evolve
steadily, taking new forms in a process that should be seen as transformation
but not decline. Central rule continued in a new and more disguised
fashion as negotiation more frequently than command came to assure
obedience. Important changes occurred in the Ottoman economy as well:
the circulation of goods began to increase; levels of personal consumption
probably rose; and the world economy came to play an ever-larger role
in the everyday lives of Ottoman subjects.
The wars of contraction, c. 1683–1798
On the international stage, military defeats and territorial contraction
marked the era, when the imperial Ottoman state was much less successful
than before. At the outset, it seems worthwhile to make several general
points.
First, at bottom, the Ottoman defeats are as difficult to explain as the
victories of earlier centuries. Sometime during the early sixteenth century,
as the wealth of the New World poured into Europe, the military
balance shifted away from the Ottomans; they lost their edge in military
technology and using similar and then inferior weapons and tactics, battled
European enemies. Moreover, the earlier military imbalance between
offensive and defensive warfare in favor of the aggressor had worked to
the Ottomans’ advantage, but now defenses became more sophisticated
and vastly more expensive. Sultan S¨uleyman the Magnificent, whose reign
had seen so many successes, died before the walls of Szigetvar, poignantly
symbolizing the difficulty of attacking fortified cities that had become an
increasingly common feature of warfare. Further, Western economies
could better afford the mounting costs of the new technologies and
defensive combat in part because of the vast infusion of wealth from
the New World. The story of Ottoman slippage and west European ascendancy
is vastly more complicated, of course, and is continued in the
subsequent chapters.
Second, during the eighteenth century, absolute monarchies emerged
in Europe that were growing more centralized than ever before. To a
certain extent, the Ottomans shared in this evolution but other states in
the world did not. The Iranian state weakened after a brief resurgence
in the earlier part of the century, collapsed, and failed to recover any
cohesive strength until the early twentieth century. Still further east, the
Moghul state and all of the rest of the Indian subcontinent fell under
French or British domination.
Third, the Ottoman defeats and territorial losses of the eighteenth century
were a very grim business but would have been still greater except
for the rivalries among west, east, and central European states. On a
number of occasions, European diplomats intervened in post-war negotiations
with the Ottomans to prevent rivals from gaining too many
concessions, thus giving the defeated Ottomans a wedge they employed
to retain lands that otherwise would have been lost. Also, while it is easy
to think of the era as one of unmitigated disasters since there were so
many defeats and withdrawals, the force of Ottoman arms and diplomatic
skills did win a number of successes, especially in the first half of the
period.
[...]
While a review of these battles, campaigns, and treaties makes apparent
the pace and depth of the Ottoman defeats, the process was not quite so
clear at the time. There were a number of important victories, at least
during the first half of the eighteenth century. For example, although
Belgrade fell just after the 1683 siege, the Ottomans recaptured it, along
with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Transylvania, in their counter-offensives during
1689 and 1690. In fact Belgrade reverted to the sultan’s rule at least
three times and remained in Ottoman hands until the early nineteenth
century. In 1711, to give another example, an Ottoman army completely
surrounded the forces of Czar Peter the Great at the Pruth river on the
Moldavian border, forcing him to abandon all of his recent conquests.
Several years later, the Ottomans regained the lost fortress of Azov on
the Black Sea. In a 1714–1718 war with Venice, the Istanbul regime regained
the Morea and retained it for more than a century, until the Greek
war of independence. Ottoman forces won other important victories in
1737, against both Austrians and Russians. For several reasons, including
French mediation and Habsburg fears of Russian success, the Ottomans,
in the 1739 peace of Belgrade, regained all that they had surrendered to
the Habsburgs in the earlier Treaty of Passarowitz. In the same year, they
again obtained Azov from the Russians who withdrew all commercial and
war ships from the Black Sea and also pulled out ofWallachia. Even after
the disasters of the war that ended at K¨u¸c¨uk Kaynarca, the Ottomans
won some victories, compelling Russia to withdraw again from the principalities
(and from the Caucasus). Catherine did so again in 1792 when
she also agreed to withdraw from ports at the mouth of the Danube."
Hier auch ein Searchinsde bei Amazon des sehr empfehlenswerten Buches:
Amazon.de: The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (New Approaches to European History): Donald Quataert: Englische Bücher
EEEK!!
Das gibt's doch nicht! Nun ist dieses Buch auch schon digitalisiert worden!
The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922: 1700-1922 - Google Buchsuche
Dann brauche ich ja nicht weiter etwas hier posten, lest euch am besten selber das Kapitel: "
Methods of Rule" durch, um etwas zu den
Janitscharen und ihrer gelegentlichen Überbewertung durch unkundige Historiker zu lesen:
Beginnt in diesem Kapitel, ab S. 99. ff.:
"
Aspects of Ottoman administration
The dev¸sirme method of recruiting administrators and soldiers – the “child levy” – was long gone by 1700 but deserves discussion here for the light it sheds on the stereotyping that remains all too prevalent in popular perceptions of the Ottoman past. ... "
Insgesamt ist natürlich das gesamte Kapitel interessant, und für
Scorpio (und wohl
Mike Hammer?) sicherlich noch dieses:
Ottoman society and popular culture
An overview of social relations among groups
Changing social mobility and clothing laws
Ottoman private spaces
Structure of the home
New public spaces
The coffee house and the bathhouse
Other forms and sites of sociability
Sufi brotherhoods and their lodges
Holidays
Natürlich sind auch die Ausführungen im Kapitel ab S. 25 "How to explain this remarkable record of Ottoman success?" sehr aufschlussrreich...
Ansonten, dieses obige Buch behandelt ja nur die zweite Hälfte des Osmanischen Reiches, also ab 1700, und für die Zeit zurück bis ins 13. Jh. nehmt den anderen Lit.Tip. im Osm. R. Subform: The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe Von Daniel Goffman:
The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern ... - Google Buchsuche
"Moreover, much of what historians thought they knew about Ottoman institutions has been challenged and rewritten. Take, for example, the cliché that the janissaries’ prowess as soldiers declined when they ceased living together in bachelor barracks and served as married men. It turns out that already in the fifteenth century, when the janissaries were the most feared military unit in the Mediterranean world, at least some were married with families."
:fs::winke: